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Using a dynamic  global general equilibrium model, the paper assesses the short-  and 
medium-term impacts of the global financial crisis on Asian economies and the implications 
of post-crisis adjustment in emerging East Asia (EEA) for the world economy. The analysis 
suggests that EEA is unlikely to be severely damaged permanently by the global financial 
crisis, and a worldwide fiscal stimulus could play an important role in stabilizing the global 
economy in crisis. EEA’s efforts at  strengthening regional demand, in conjunction with 
adopting a more flexible exchange rate regime, will promote more balanced regional growth 
and facilitate an orderly global rebalancing. However, despite the growing size of EEA in the 
global economy, the region’s growth rebalancing has only modest spillover effects on the 
rest of the world. EEA can contribute to global growth, but it alone cannot become the sole 
engine driving post-crisis growth in the world economy. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in the United States (US) in the fall of 2008, 
Asian economies have experienced substantial growth swings. In the initial stages of the 
crisis, as global aggregate demand dropped due to the falling consumer and investor 
confidence, exports from all major East Asian economies declined sharply. Imports from 
these  economies  also plummeted at almost similar rates to those of export declines, 
reflecting the tightly knit regional production networks and supply chains in Asia. Given the 
high trade dependence in most Asian economies, the slump in trade significantly dragged 
down their economic growth in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009.  
But the Asian economies rebounded strongly beginning in the second quarter of 2009. The 
extraordinarily massive economic stimulus provided by governments and central banks in 
major  advanced and emerging  economies—including those in Asia—in response to  the 
crisis helped stabilize financial markets, improve the confidence of investors and consumers, 
and foster the recovery of economic activity.
1
The global recovery now remains on track but faces considerable downside risks. The recent 
unfolding of the European sovereign debt crisis has highlighted the risks arising from the 
rapid accumulation of public debt, suggesting that the positive effects of fiscal stimulus could 
be more than offset by the markets’ concerns over long-term debt sustainability. With most 
advanced economies embracing fiscal consolidation in the coming years and inventory 
restocking gradually running its course, the future pace of global recovery will be largely 
contingent on the degree to which the sources of demand can shift from the public to the 
private sector. However, given that  the reconstruction of the financial sector and the 
deleveraging  of private balance sheets could take a long time  to resolve and that the 
unemployment  rate  remains high in major advanced economies,  one  would  expect to 
observe a slower global economic growth and consequently an extended shortfall in global 
aggregate demand in the years to come.  
 As a result, the inventory cycle turned from 
depleting to rebuilding in most parts of the world and global trade rebounded. The improved 
external  environment,  together with  stronger  domestic  demand spurred by these  policy 
stimulus measures, led to a dramatic V-shaped recovery in Asian economies. By the end of 
2009, most Asian economies resumed their pre-crisis growth levels. Some of them have 
begun to moderate their macroeconomic stimulus policies in the face of the increasing risks 
of overheating, inflation, and asset price bubbles. 
The slower growth of  aggregate  demand in  the US and European  economies  will pose 
significant challenges for Asian economies. With an export-oriented development strategy, 
emerging Asian economies have maintained not only high growth, but also large current 
account surpluses in the past decade, contributing to the global current account imbalance. 
As  economic  growth in advanced economies  remains  slow, Asian economies need to 
change the source of their growth from exports to extraregional markets to regional demand 
in order to sustain growth. The reorientation of growth toward Asia’s internal demand can 
contribute to the orderly correction of the global imbalance. In fact, the ongoing crisis has 
indeed induced  a partial and disorderly correction of the global imbalance, with a large 
contraction of demand in the US, a sharp increase in US household savings and an 
improvement in its current account. This adjustment has not  been accompanied by the 
collapse of the US dollar, however, as was feared by many experts and policymakers before 
                                                 
1 Immediately after the eruption of the global financial crisis, governments and central banks around the world 
responded swiftly to deal with liquidity and solvency problems of affected financial institutions through easing 
monetary policy and recapitalizing or restructuring troubled financial institutions. In addition to such measures, 
fiscal stimulus packages have been implemented around the world to boost demand. The IMF estimated that the 
total amount of fiscal stimulus in the G-20 countries amounted to US$692 billion in 2009, about 1.4% of their 
combined GDP. The US, the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and Germany are the key contributors of global 
fiscal stimulus, with stimulus packages worth approximately 2% of their respective GDP. ADBI Working Paper 254    Kawai and Zhai 
 
2 
the outbreak of the financial crisis; it has been accompanied by a global collapse of trade 
and output, and a rise in unemployment. The ongoing ultra-expansionary monetary policy—
including quantitative easing—could lead to a sharp US dollar depreciation, which may exert 
significant adjustment pressures on Asian economies. 
The aim of this paper is to provide a  model-based analysis of the adjustment of Asian 
economies in the wake of the global financial crisis. Specifically, it attempts to answer the 
following questions: What are the macroeconomic impacts of the global financial crisis on 
Asian economies? What are the effects of global fiscal stimulus, and how would it contribute 
to mitigate the impacts of the ongoing crisis? What are the roles of emerging East Asia 
(EEA) in the rebalancing of global demand following the crisis? How much will EEA’s efforts 
at currency appreciation and structural reforms for its own growth rebalancing contribute to 
sustained global economic growth? We use a multi-region, intertemporal dynamic general 
equilibrium model of the world economy to simulate different scenarios for the global 
financial crisis. Our quantitative simulations suggest that East Asia is unlikely to be severely 
damaged permanently by the global financial crisis, and a worldwide fiscal stimulus could 
play an important role in stabilizing the global economy in crisis.  East Asia’s efforts  at 
strengthening regional demand, in conjunction with adopting a more flexible exchange rate 
regime in the region, will promote more balanced regional growth and facilitate an orderly 
global rebalancing. However, despite the growing size of EEA in the global economy, Asia-
led  growth rebalancing has only modest spillover effects on the rest of the world. Even 
though EEA can contribute to global growth, it alone cannot become the sole engine driving 
post-crisis growth in the world economy. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section  2 describes the model used in the analysis. 
Section 3 discusses the design of the simulation scenarios, reports their results, and 
provides our interpretation. Finally section 4 offers conclusions. 
2.  THE MODEL 
The model used in this study is a version of a multi-country dynamic general equilibrium 
model for the world economy inspired by the new open economy macroeconomics literature 
(Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995 and 1996). It combines the long-run properties of neoclassical 
models with short-run dynamics arising from nominal rigidities a  la  new Keynesian 
macroeconomics. The structure of the model closely follows the global integrated monetary 
and fiscal model (GIMF) developed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Research 
Department (Kumhof and Laxton 2007; Laxton 2008).
2
                                                 
2 See Zhang, Zhang, and Han (2010) for a recent application of the GIMF model to evaluating the impacts of the 
US credit crisis on Asia.  
 Agents in the model are forward 
looking, endowed with perfect foresight and subject to the dynamic budget constraints. The 
model features overlapping generations agents with finite economic lifetime. This leads to 
the non-Ricardian feature of the model and makes it suitable for fiscal policy analysis. 
Countries and regions in the model are linked through trade and financial markets. Nominal 
price and wage stickiness, as well as real frictions in investment, are incorporated to 
generate more realistic adjustment dynamics. The presence of nominal price and wage 
rigidity allows monetary policy to play a key role. Different from the GIMF, our model is 
deterministic, excluding stochastic shocks or other uncertainties. The model is in annual 
frequency and calibrated to the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP, version 7) global 
database with 2004 as the base year.  This section outlines the basic structure of the model 
and discusses its parameterization. The detailed specifications of the model are described in 
the Appendix. ADBI Working Paper 254    Kawai and Zhai 
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(1) Model structure 
The world economy in the model consists of four economic blocs: the US, Japan, EEA, and 
the rest of the world (ROW). There are four types of agents in each region, namely, 
households,  labor  unions, firms, and government. Households have finite lives, facing a 
constant probability of survival, as in the perpetual youth model in line with Blanchard (1985) 
and Yaari (1965). Households consume a basket of goods and services and exhibit habit 
persistence in their consumption. The model distinguishes two types of households: forward-
looking ones and liquidity-constrained ones.  The former own the portfolio of domestic firms. 
They also hold two types of nominal bonds: domestic bonds issued by the domestic 
government denominated in domestic currency, and international bonds issued by the US 
and denominated in US dollars. International bonds are traded only bilaterally with the US 
and issued in zero net supply worldwide. The liquidity-constrained households do not have 
access to domestic or international capital markets. They finance their consumption 
exclusively with current disposable labor and transfer incomes. Firms’ investment is subject 
to adjustment costs, which allow for the variation in Tobin’s q  and generate plausible 
investment dynamics.   
The model assumes a continuum of labor unions in each economic bloc which purchase 
labor services from households and sell labor to firms.
3
The production activity is characterized by monopolistic competition. There is a continuum of 
firms in the production sector which produce differentiated varieties of products. They set the 
nominal prices of their products in domestic and exporting markets to maximize the present 
discounted value of profits. Similar to wage setting, price changes are subject to adjustment 
costs, which give rise to nominal price rigidities. When exporting, firms set prices in terms of 
the export-market currency, i.e., traded goods are invoiced in the currencies of the importing 
economic bloc.   
 Unions are monopolistic suppliers of 
differentiated labor inputs to domestic firms and face nominal rigidities in wage setting. They 
set nominal wages according to constant-elasticity  downward-sloping demand schedules 
and quadratic costs of wage adjustment as in Rotemberg (1982).  
Production  technology  in each sector is modeled using nested constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) and Cobb-Douglas functions. At the top level, the output is produced as a 
combination of public capital and an aggregate private input using Cobb-Douglas technology. 
At the second  level, the aggregate private input  is  split into an intermediate  input  and 
aggregate primary factor. At the third  level,  the  aggregate primary factor is further 
disaggregated into private  capital and aggregate  labor. Finally, at the bottom level, 
aggregate labor is decomposed into the differentiated labor input by each union. At each 
level of production, there is a unit cost function that is dual to the CES aggregator function 
and demand functions for corresponding inputs. The top-level unit cost function defines the 
marginal cost of sectoral output. The stock of public capital is identical for all firms and 
provided free of charge to them. As the production function exhibits decreasing returns to 
scale for private inputs, the return to public capital is distributed to firms as profits.  
International trade is modeled using a nested Armington structure, in which domestic 
absorption is allocated between domestic goods and aggregate imports, and then aggregate 
imports are allocated across sourcing countries, which  determine bilateral trade flows. 
Demand for domestic and imported goods is expressed as a composite good defined by the 
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator over domestic and imported varieties, respectively.  
The government collects tax and issues debt to finance its budget deficit. There are five 
types of tax in the model: labor income tax, capital income tax, sales tax, import tariff, and 
lump-sum tax on households. Government consumption and investment are exogenous and 
the lump-sum tax on households is endogenously adjusted to achieve a target path for the 
                                                 
3 The introduction of labor unions is for model simplification, as aggregation across generations would be difficult 
if nominal rigidities were faced by households rather than unions.   ADBI Working Paper 254    Kawai and Zhai 
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desired government debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio. The monetary policy rule in 
the model follows a Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor rule in which the nominal  interest rate 
depends on the lagged nominal interest rate, the inflation gap and the output growth gap. 
For EEA, the monetary policy rule is augmented with the gap between actual and desired 
values of the bilateral nominal exchange rate against the US dollar, reflecting the dollar 
stabilization regimes in some EEA economies.   
 (2) Model calibration 
The calibration of a dynamic model with the assumption of perfect foresight involves finding 
a set of data that covers all periods of the model and is consistent with the intra-period and 
intertemporal equilibria. This set of data needs to replicate the data of the base year and 
could serve as the dynamic benchmark equilibrium of the model. There could be  two 
alternative calibration strategies here. The first one, the so-called steady state calibration, 
would consider the base year as a steady state equilibrium and the dynamic benchmark 
equilibrium of the model as a steady state growth path. The second one would assume that 
the economy in the base year is a temporal equilibrium along a dynamic adjustment path, 
that is, the dynamic benchmark equilibrium of the model is a transitional dynamic path to a 
final steady state (Knudsen et al. 1998; Wendner 1999). Here  we follow the second 
approach and calibrate the model for a non-steady state situation.  
The model is calibrated to GTAP database with 2004 as the base year. The GTAP database 
contains a set of consistent input-output tables and bilateral trade data with detailed country 
and sector disaggregation. For most elasticity parameters and dynamic adjustment 
parameters, we draw on the GIMF and other dynamic general equilibrium models in 
determining their values.  
In calibrating the household sector, we assume that in the US, Japan, and ROW the share of 
liquidity-constrained consumers is 25%. In EEA the share is higher at 40%, reflecting the 
underdeveloped nature of financial markets in this region. The households are assumed to 
have a finite planning horizon of 20 years, implying a constant yearly death rate of 5%. In 
addition,  the  labor productivity of each generation is assumed to decline throughout his 
lifetime at an annual rate of 5%. The value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 
0.33, slightly higher than those chosen in the GIMF model. The habit persistence parameter 
for consumption is set to 0.4 as in Kumhof and Laxton (2007).  We set the weight 
parameters of leisure and consumption in the household’s utility function in such a way that 
on aggregate 33% of available time endowment during work years is spent at work in the 
base year. The rate of time preference in each economic bloc is set to obtain a reasonable 
net foreign asset position in the steady state.  
In the supply side, elasticity  of  substitution between capital and labor is set at 0.8. The 
elasticity of substitution between labor varieties, which determines the markup in the labor 
market, is assumed to be 7.3 in the US, Japan, and EEA and 6.0 in ROW. This assumption 
implies relatively competitive labor markets in the US, Japan, and EEA. The depreciation 
rate of capital is assumed to be 8% per year. The data for capital stock in each economic 
bloc is taken from the GTAP database. The ratio of public capital to GDP is assumed to be 
30% in the base year and the elasticity of GDP with respect to public capital is assumed to 
be 0.1.  
Following the literature of business cycle models, the elasticity of  substitution between 
imports and domestic goods, i.e. the Armington elasticity, is set equal to 2.0.
4
                                                 
4 The trade literature on empirical estimation of the Armington elasticity usually found a high value ranging from 
about 6 to 15, and these estimates are typically used in applied general equilibrium models for trade policy 
analysis (see, e.g. Hertel et al., 2004). See Ruhl (2003) for a reconciliation of the low elasticity value found in 
aggregate high frequency time series data with the high elasticity found in cross-section data.  
  The elasticity 
of  substitution  between  imports  across economic blocs  is 2.5.  Elasticity of substitution ADBI Working Paper 254    Kawai and Zhai 
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between varieties of goods ranges from 4.3 to 6.0, implying a markup of 20% to 30%.  Japan 
and ROW have relatively high markups while the markups in the US and EEA are lower.  
The parameters for nominal rigidity and real adjustment costs that govern the dynamics of 
the model are drawn from the GIMF and the Global Economic Model (GEM) of the IMF. In 
the monetary policy rule, the weights for the inflation gap and the output growth gap are both 
set at 0.5. For EEA, the weight on the changes in the exchange rate is set to 1.  In the 
simulations for fiscal stimulus below in Section 3, an alternative accommodative monetary 
policy rule is used with a zero weight for the output growth gap and the weight(s) on other 
gap(s) unchanged.  
In the baseline scenario for model calibration, EEA is assumed to have a higher growth rate 
of productivity in initial periods. Its labor-augmented productivity grows at 10% in the base 
year and gradually declines to the global average growth trend of 3% after 25 years. In 
contrast, productivity growth in Japan is assumed to rise from 1.6% in the base year to 3% in 
the period after 25 years. The consumer price index (CPI) inflation target is set to 2% per 
annum for all regions. Time preference rates in the base year are endogenously determined 
in the baseline scenario to match the base year consumption in each economic bloc. These 
base year time preference rates are assumed to gradually converge to their long-run values 
within 40 years. Similarly, a constant adjustment parameter for Tobin’s q is added to the 
arbitrage equation for each sector’s q to reproduce the baseline-scenario investment level in 
the base year.
5
3.  SIMULATION SCENARIOS 
  
To  explore the implications of the global  financial  crisis  for East Asia, we  simulate  five 
scenarios. All these scenarios are simulated in a cumulative fashion, so that the second 
scenario includes the first as well as the second shocks; the third includes the first, second, 
and third shocks; and so on.  
The first scenario examines the effects of an economic crisis confined to the US alone. It 
assumes a US recession induced by a collapse of domestic investment and consumption. In 
this scenario, US households are assumed to be more concerned about their future—their 
desire to save increases and their consumption declines. In the model this is represented by 
lowering forward-looking households’ time preference by two percentage points per annum 
permanently. In addition, we assume the risk premium of investors in the US to rise by five 
percentage points for the next three years and gradually decline after that until it vanishes in 
another three years. This scenario simulates a temporary drop in domestic demand in the 
US triggered by the financial crisis.  
The second scenario looks at a world-wide financial crisis which goes beyond the US 
recession. It assumes, in addition to the US, all other regions also experience a fall in 
consumption and investment due to the contagion through financial and confidence channels. 
The shocks in non-US regions are assumed to be half of that in the US, i.e., a one 
percentage  point  reduction in households’ time preference rate and a two and a  half 
percentage points rise of the risk premium of investors.  
The third scenario considers the impacts of globally concerted expansionary fiscal policies to 
deal with the global financial crisis. We assume a global fiscal stimulus package under which 
all countries increase government spending by 2% of GDP over a two-year period. Such 
government spending is assumed to be distributed evenly between government 
consumption and investment. The fiscal stimulus is assumed to be temporary, as in the 
period following the expenditure expansion, lump-sum taxes adjust to return the government 
debt-to-GDP ratio back to its baseline value over time. As monetary policy can play an 
                                                 
5 This constant adjustment parameter can be interpreted as risk premium. See McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1998) for 
a similar treatment in their multi-sectoral, intertemporal G-Cubed model. ADBI Working Paper 254    Kawai and Zhai 
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important role in determining the effects of fiscal expansion, the simulations here explore two 
types of a monetary policy rule for the two years of fiscal stimulus, that is, the standard 
interest rate rule in our benchmark model and an accommodative interest rate rule. The 
standard interest rate rule has equal weights on the inflation gap and the output growth gap, 
while the accommodative interest rate rule has a zero weight on the output growth gap. 
Given that fiscal expansion tends to raise both output and inflation, the interest rate hikes are 
smaller in the latter policy rule, suggesting a more accommodative monetary policy in the 
face of fiscal stimulus.     
The final two scenarios look at the impact of other types of policy measures designed to 
rebalance growth in EEA. The fourth scenario examines the role of exchange rate policy. It 
assumes that EEA allows large currency movements against the US dollar by putting a zero 
weight on the exchange rate gap in its monetary policy reaction function. The fifth scenario 
postulates that, in addition to greater exchange rate flexibility,  EEA  boosts  its  domestic 
consumption and investment through structural  reforms. Instead of specifying  the  exact 
nature  for these structural  reforms, we capture their effects using a permanent one 
percentage point increase in the time preference rate of EEA’s forward-looking households 
and a one percentage point reduction of its investors’ risk premium. These two scenarios 
simulate a partial global rebalancing initiative led by the adjustment in EEA.  
 (1) US recession 
The macroeconomic effects of a US recession—the combined negative investment and 
consumption shocks—are reported in Figure 1. The US recession leads to a sharp output 
loss in the US, with real GDP falling by around 5% in the first two years compared with the 
baseline. The GDP reduction is tempered after that and output begins to expand after seven 
years, driven by stronger net external demand and the recovery in investment. As to the 
components of domestic demand, investment exhibits greater volatility than consumption. It 
contracts by around 15% in the initial years and then, along with the diminished investment 
risk premium, expands by nearly 20% after 12-15 years. In comparison with investment, the 
change in private consumption is more modest, but still significant. The consumption of US 
households declines by 9% in the first three years, but begins to increase after fifteen years 
because of the expanded output and income.   
As the shrinking domestic absorption significantly drags down imports, the US current 
account as a ratio to GDP improves by around five percentage points in the first five years. 
This improvement in the current account gradually diminishes to 3% of GDP in the medium-
term. The falling US demand depresses US domestic prices relative to foreign prices, 
leading to a real depreciation of the US dollar. The real effective exchange rate of the US 
dollar weakens by 10-12% initially relative to the baseline. The US dollar depreciation 
moderates to 3% in fifteen years. The more rapid recovery of domestic demand relative to 
supply implies an excess demand in the medium term, thereby moderating the pace of US 
dollar depreciation.  
The dynamics of prices are driven by supply and demand conditions, the degree of nominal 
rigidities, and monetary policy reactions. In tandem with the initial demand collapse, inflation 
falls by two percentage points initially. After five years, the drop in the inflation rate narrows 
to less than half of a percentage point. Lower inflation leads to a lower interest rate—through 
the Taylor rule-based monetary policy—causing larger interest differentials between the US 
and other economic blocs, which reinforces the initial US dollar depreciation. Nominal 
exchange rate changes are the major channel to achieve real exchange rate adjustment, 
reflecting the sluggish price responses, and the effects of inflation targeting and flexible 
exchange rates.  ADBI Working Paper 254    Kawai and Zhai 
 
7 
Figure 1: Impacts of US Recession 
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Reduced US import demand leads to trade spillover effects, with all other economic blocs 
experiencing falling external demand in comparison with the baseline. The extent of these 
spillovers in different economic blocs depends on their respective trade dependence on the 
US. Generally, economies with larger export exposure to the US are more severely impacted 
than those less dependent on the US market. However, exchange rate policy also plays a 
significant role in determining the impact of trade spillovers of the US recession. This is 
evident from the divergent movements in real exchange rates in initial years between Japan 
(and ROW) and EEA. As shown Figure 1, while both Japan and ROW experience large real 
appreciation initially, the real exchange rate of EEA  depreciates in the first three years 
because of the non-zero weight on the gap of the nominal exchange rate against the US 
dollar in its monetary policy rule. Consequently, the export and current account balance of 
EEA only decline slightly in the initial two years, in contrast to those in Japan and ROW.  
Beside the trade channel, international capital markets offer another channel though which 
the US recession impacts the world economy. The declining US import demand lowers the 
profitability of investment  in the short run, leading to a tendency to reduce investment 
everywhere. However, investment may be boosted by the declines in real interest rates, 
made possible by monetary policy reactions in the short run and higher US savings in the 
longer term. The combined net effect is an investment rise in all the three non-US regions. In 
Japan and ROW, investment rises by 0.5-0.8% in the first year and 5-6% in the seventh year. 
In EEA where the exchange rate target in its monetary policy rule leads to a sharp drop in 
the nominal interest rate, investment expands by 5-10% in the initial six years in comparison 
with the baseline. Lower interest rates also stimulate consumption in EEA and ROW. In 
Japan, private consumption falls in the first year and rises only slightly from then on, mainly 
due to its relatively larger drops in employment and labor income. Given that Japan is a net 
holder of US-dollar bonds, the negative revaluation effect arising from US dollar depreciation 
also contributes to its consumption weakness.  
As the trade and capital flow effects partly offset each other, the net effect of the US 
recession on output in other regions are relatively modest, standing around a 1% decline in 
the first four years in Japan and ROW. EEA’s real GDP expands by 2-3% in the initial years, 
at the expense of higher inflation, due to its policy of partially stabilizing the exchange rate 
against the US dollar. Consistent with other studies such as McKibbin and Stoeckel (2009), 
our results suggest that a recession in the US alone would have small negative impacts on 
the world economy. A US recession can even raise economic growth in the short run in 
economies whose exchange rates are relatively stable against the US dollar through real 
effective currency depreciation. Of course given the pivotal role of the US in the global 
financial market, the contagion effect leads to a world-wide demand slowdown.  
(2) A global financial crisis 
The results of the scenario of the global financial crisis are reported in Figure 2. Given that 
the US has  small external trade exposure  relative to its GDP, the world-wide demand 
slowdown brings only modest additional impacts on the US economy in comparison with the 
scenario of US only recession. However, for other regions, the contagion-induced demand 
drops cause significant impacts on their domestic economy. Both consumption and 
investment fall in initial years in comparison with the baseline in Japan and ROW, leading to 
a sharp contraction in their real GDP. CPI inflation drops by as much as two percentage 
points initially in these two regions. In EEA, despite a larger drop in the nominal interest rate 
in response to lower inflation, consumption hardly expands in the first six years and 
investment increases only by 2% or so initially. As a result, EEA’s real GDP shrinks by 1% in 
the first three years in comparison with the baseline.  ADBI Working Paper 254    Kawai and Zhai 
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Figure 2: Impacts of the Global Financial Crisis  
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Global trade is also negatively impacted by the declining demand in the wake of a global 
financial crisis. With a relatively sharper drop in domestic demand, the US dollar depreciates 
against other currencies and, consequently, the US’s exports increase by around 10-15% 
relative to the baseline. However, all other regions experience declines in exports in initial 
eight years, ranging from around 3%  for  EEA  and around 7%  for Japan. The relatively 
smaller export decline in EEA  is mainly a result of its monetary  policy,  which partially 
stabilizes its currency to the US dollar. As shown in the figure, the real effective exchange 
rate of EEA actually depreciates in the first two years in the wake of the global financial crisis. 
Despite a relatively modest drop in exports, EEA’s current account surplus shrinks by nearly 
3% of its GDP, a larger relative decline than that in Japan and other regions of the world, 
due to the region’s large volume of exports relative to GDP.  
 (3) Global fiscal expansion with alternative monetary policy rules 
The third  scenario assumes that all economic blocs in the world increase government 
spending—by 2% of GDP—for two years, while following their respective monetary policy 
rules. Figure 3A presents the dynamic impacts of globally concerted fiscal stimulus 
packages under the benchmark monetary policy rule, which are plotted as changes from the 
second scenario—i.e., the scenario of a global financial crisis. The benchmark monetary 
policy rule follows the standard Taylor rule, except in EEA where the interest rate responds 
positively to the exchange rate gap as well as the inflation and output growth gaps. With the 
temporary fiscal expansion all over the world, real GDP, consumption and investment all rise 
during the period of fiscal stimulus and beyond. The increase in real GDP during the two 
years of fiscal expansion is around 1.5%, suggesting fiscal multipliers of 0.75. Real GDP 
drops by around 0.2% after the completion of fiscal stimulus, but begins to expand by around 
0.5% after six  years, largely due to the larger stock of public capital. Increased fiscal 
expenditures lead to more employment and higher wages, boosting private consumption. 
EEA  experiences the largest rise in private consumption during the period of fiscal 
expansion, reflecting its higher share of liquidity-constrained households. During the years of 
fiscal stimulus, private investment drops by around 4% in the US, Japan, and ROW, and 
more than 2% in EEA  reflecting the crowding-out effects through rises in interest rates. 
However, private investment enjoys larger gains in the medium and long run, thanks to the 
long-term crowding-in effect of public investment.  
Current account balances and real exchange rates are generally little impacted by the world-
wide fiscal expansion. Fiscal deficits in the two expansion years widen by 1.7-1.8% of GDP, 
as government spending of 2% of GDP is offset by additional tax revenues due to faster 
economic growth. Consequently, the ratio of government debt to GDP rises only by two to 
three percentage points in the fourth year, then gradually fall to the baseline level with 
increases in household lump-sum tax.   
Figure 3B presents the effects of global fiscal stimulus under the accommodative monetary 
policy rule, where the interest rate responds only to the inflation gap (and the exchange rate 
gap in EEA).  With monetary accommodation, inflation is generally higher and the real 
interest rate is lower, which facilitates the expansion of consumption and investment.  As a 
result, there is almost no crowding out of fiscal spending. This is in sharp contrast with the 
simulation  results  under the benchmark monetary policy rule—as shown in Figure 3A—
where private investment during the years of fiscal expansion is negatively affected, showing 
evidence of strong crowding-out effects of public expenditure. ADBI Working Paper 254    Kawai and Zhai 
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To deepen our analysis of the impact of globally concerted fiscal stimulus, we have run 
separate simulations under which each economic bloc alone engages in fiscal stimulus. 
Table 1 summarizes the fiscal multipliers of individual regions’ fiscal actions and of 
worldwide fiscal actions. Several interesting observations can be made. First, the fiscal 
multipliers rise significantly by moving from the benchmark to the accommodative monetary 
policy rule in every region of the world. Under the benchmark rule, the fiscal multipliers are in 
the range of 0.55 (Japan) to 0.80 (EEA), while under the accommodative rule they rise to the 
range of 1.01 (EEA) to 1.42 (US). This can be explained by the change in the interest rate 
rule from the one that responds to the output growth gap (benchmark rule) to the one that 
does not (accommodative rule). Under the benchmark rule, the interest rate rises  in 
response to both the inflationary pressure and output expansion (and declines in response to 
exchange  rate  appreciation  in EEA)  arising from fiscal stimulus, while under the 
accommodative rule the interest rate rises less responding only to the inflationary pressure 
(and declines in response to exchange rate appreciation in EEA). In other words, the smaller 
interest rate increase makes the fiscal multipliers larger under the accommodative rule than 
under the benchmark monetary policy rule. 
Table 1: Comparison of Fiscal Multipliers by Economic Bloc 
  Stimulus in 
  US   Japan   EEA  ROW  World 
Benchmark monetary policy rule 
US  0.61  0.02  0.03  0.15  0.81 
Japan  0.08  0.55  0.06  0.12  0.81 
EEA  -0.30  0.06  0.80  0.24  0.80 
ROW  0.10  0.02  0.04  0.62  0.78 
World  0.20  0.08  0.11  0.40  0.79 
US 
Accommodative monetary policy rule 
1.42  0.13  0.15  0.28  1.65 
Japan  0.18  1.37  0.21  0.23  1.64 
EEA  0.23  0.14  1.01  0.33  1.48 
ROW  0.15  0.09  0.12  1.30  1.45 
World  0.52  0.25  0.23  0.80  1.53 
Note: Fiscal multiplier is defined as a percentage change in GDP induced by fiscal expansion of 1% of GDP. 
Source: Authors’ model simulations. 
Second, the extent of the rise in fiscal multipliers, associated with a move from the 
benchmark to the accommodative policy rule,  varies across regions in the world; fiscal 
multipliers rise the least in EEA (from 0.80 to 1.01) while those in other regions rise much 
more substantially (e.g., from 0.61 to 1.42 in the US). This can be explained by the specific 
interest rate rule chosen for EEA, i.e., the inclusion of the exchange rate gap, as well as this 
region’s large trade leakage from its imports.  Under either monetary  policy rule, EEA’s 
interest rate would rise the least among the four regions in the world because the interest 
rate rise resulting from the positive inflationary gap (and the output growth gap under the 
benchmark rule) associated with fiscal expansion would be partly offset by the interest rate 
decline  resulting from the  real  currency  appreciation  pressure.  Under the benchmark 
monetary policy rule, EEA’s own fiscal multiplier is 0.80, the largest among the four regions 
in the world. In this rule, even though the impact of fiscal expansion would leak out most 
substantially in EEA to other regions due to its having the highest ratio of imports to GDP, 
the favorable effect of the interest rate change dominates the unfavorable trade leakage 
effect, thereby making  EEA’s fiscal multiplier the largest in the world. Under the 
accommodative monetary policy rule, however, EEA’s own fiscal  multiplier is 1.01, the 
smallest among the four economic blocs. This is explained by the fact that the favorable ADBI Working Paper 254    Kawai and Zhai 
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interest rate effect is more than offset by the unfavorable trade leakage effect. That is, 
although EEA’s interest rate rises the least, in response to its own fiscal expansion, among 
the four regions in the world, the large trade leakage effect dominates the interest rate effect, 
thereby making EEA’s fiscal multiplier the smallest in the world. 
Finally, under  the  accommodative monetary policy rule, nearly 30% of the impact of the 
global financial expansion on EEA’s fiscal multiplier effect comes from the stimulus in other 
regions. This suggests that, under an accommodative global monetary policy environment, a 
globally coordinated fiscal stimulus action will be desirable for EEA (as well as for other 
economic blocs in the world). 
(4) Exchange rate flexibility in emerging East Asia 
The results of the fourth scenario—impacts of increasing exchange rate flexibility of the EEA 
currency vis-à-vis the US dollar—are presented in Figure 4A. As a result of dropping the 
exchange rate target in its monetary policy rule, EEA’s nominal exchange rate appreciates 
against the US dollar by 7.3% and 4.8% respectively in the first and second years. An 
appreciating exchange rate leads to falling exports and, consequently, shrinking aggregate 
demand. With excess supply over demand, CPI inflation falls by around three percentage 
points in the initial two years. Because of differential inflation rates between EEA and other 
regions in the world, EEA’s real effective exchange rate appreciates 2.5% and 1.2% in the 
first and second years. 
EEA’s exports fall by 2% in the first two years after introducing full exchange rate flexibility, 
then gradually recover and begin to expand in the fifteenth year. It might be surprising that 
EEA’s imports also  decline at around the same pace as  exports, despite currency 
appreciation inducing a substitution toward cheaper imports. The falling income associated 
with output contraction, as well as the rising real interest rate due to lower inflation, lead to 
weaker domestic demand. As shown in Figure 4A, EEA’s investment and consumption fall 
by 3-4% in the initial two years, dampening demand for imports. As a result, EEA’s current 
account surplus declines only by 0.8% of GDP in the first year. Reflecting the importance of 
export demand in EEA economies, this economic bloc experiences a large and sustained 
GDP contraction in the wake of its currency appreciation. 
 ADBI Working Paper 254    Kawai and Zhai 
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Figure 3A: Impacts of Global Fiscal Expansion under  
the Benchmark Monetary Policy Rule 
Real GDP
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Despite the relatively large effect on its own economy, EEA’s currency appreciation has only 
modest impacts on other regions, as indicated in the left panel of Figure 4B. Given its strong 
economic linkage with EEA, Japan experiences the largest contraction in trade, with a 0.8% 
decline in exports and a 0.5% decline in imports in the initial two years. The US is less 
impacted and ROW is the least impacted, consistent with their limited  respective  export 
dependence on EEA. As both exports and imports shrink, the current account balances of 
the US, Japan, and ROW change little following EEA’s introduction of full exchange rate 
flexibility and currency appreciation. Consequently, the impacts on their real GDP range from 
0.20% to 0.35% in the initial years and are less than 0.1% annually afterwards.  
(5) Expanding regional demand in emerging East Asia 
The results of our fifth scenario—EEA’s domestic demand expansion in addition to its full 
exchange rate flexibility—are plotted in Figure 4A and the right panel of Figure 4B. As shown 
in Figure 4A, the rise in domestic consumption and investment partly offsets the negative 
impacts from currency appreciation on EEA’s output, resulting in a smaller initial loss in GDP 
compared with the fourth scenario. As stronger domestic demand sucks more imports and 
discourages exports, the imports of EEA rise by 2-6% and its exports fall by around 6% 
initially. As a result, the current account surplus of EEA declines by 5% of GDP over a period 
of decade. Reflecting the changes in relative prices induced by the demand expansion in 
EEA, the real effective exchange rate of the  EEA  currency appreciates  much more—by 
around 4% initially—than in the fourth scenario. 
The deterioration in EEA’s current account balance is mirrored in the improvement in the 
current account balances in other regions of the world. As shown in the right panel of Figure 
4B, the current account balances of the US, Japan, and ROW improve by 0.4-0.6% of their 
respective GDP. Although US experiences larger export expansion in comparison to ROW, 
its gain in the current account balance is smaller due to its lower trade dependence. Rising 
net exports in non-EEA regions stimulate their GDP growth in the short run, but declining 
domestic demand  soon dominates the improvement in net exports, resulting  in  GDP 
contraction from the fourth year onwards. The reason is that rising domestic demand in EEA 
reduces its trade surplus and, hence, net capital outflows, pushing up real interest rates 
globally. With the negative effect of higher real interest rates on investment and consumption 
dominating the improvement in net exports, real GDP contracts in the US, Japan, and ROW 
over the medium  term.  This result highlights the  importance of the general equilibrium 
impacts on international capital flows in analyzing the long-term implications of adjustment in 
global current account imbalances.  ADBI Working Paper 254    Kawai and Zhai 
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Figure 4A: Impacts of EEA’s Growth Rebalancing Policies on EEA 
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Figure 4B: Impacts of EEA’s Growth Rebalancing Policies  on Other 
Regions
Real GDP - Scenario 5
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4.  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has examined the implications of the global financial crisis, emanating from the 
US, and of a global fiscal stimulus package as well as EEA’s dynamic adjustment toward 
global rebalancing. Especially, using a calibrated global dynamic general equilibrium model, 
we have simulated the scenarios of a  US recession,  a  global  recession,  worldwide 
expansion in fiscal spending, and  EEA’s rebalancing policies—such as introducing full 
exchange rate flexibility and expansion in regional demand. Simulation results of the first two 
scenarios suggest that a financial crisis, if confined to the US alone, would have only small 
negative impacts on the world economy. A global financial crisis, which spreads demand 
contraction from the US to other regions in the world, would cause a slowdown in economic 
growth and trade all over the world.  But the negative  impacts are not evenly distributed 
across regions. Because of its exchange rate regime that stabilizes the currency against the 
US dollar, EEA is least impacted by a financial crisis, whether in the US alone or world-wide, 
in terms of output.   
We have also investigated the effects of global fiscal stimulus in response to the crisis. With 
a global fiscal stimulus package of 2% of GDP for two years, world GDP is likely to be lifted 
by  2.0% and 3.0% during the period of fiscal expansion under the benchmark  and 
accommodative monetary policy rules, respectively. This result suggests that fiscal stimulus 
combined with an appropriate monetary policy rule can serve as an important stabilizer for 
the world economy during the crisis. For EEA economies, given their high level of trade 
dependence, globally coordinated fiscal stimulus would be much more desirable than acting 
just on its own.   
With its large current account  surplus and increasing importance in the world economy, 
EEA’s growth rebalancing policy is an important component of the global effort to unwind the 
global imbalance. The exchange rate  inflexibility  in  EEA  is widely regarded as a major 
impediment to global rebalancing. Our simulation results show that exchange rate flexibility 
alone in EEA would not contribute much to the correction of its current account imbalance. 
Given EEA’s highly export-dependent growth pattern, its currency appreciation would lead to 
large output and income losses, depressing its appetite for imports and reducing its current 
account surplus  by only 2% of GDP. Other types of  policies—particularly of a structural 
reform nature—to boost regional demand, supported by greater flexibility in the  regional 
currency, would be needed to have a much larger and persistent impact on EEA’s current 
account.  
Indeed, an appreciation of 5% in EEA’s real effective exchange rate, driven by its domestic 
demand expansion and nominal currency appreciation, is likely to reduce its own current 
account balance by 5% of GDP. However, without any adjustment in any other country, this 
change in EEA’s current account will be largely evenly distributed among other regions of 
the world. The simulation results show that the US current account deficit narrows only by 
0.5% of GDP under this scenario, hardly correcting the US and, hence, global imbalances. 
Although the global economic impact of EEA is growing, its rebalancing policy has limited 
impact globally, suggesting the need for policy actions on the part of the US in reducing its 
own current account deficit.  Essentially,  both  the current-account surplus and deficit 
economies should implement their respective policies in order to reduce the global 
imbalance and achieve sustained global economic growth. 
Several important limitations of our modeling exercises should be mentioned. First, our 
model does not explicitly incorporate the linkages through global financial markets and the 
mechanisms of co-movements in asset prices. As they are important transmission channels 
through which the US recession may drag down the EEA and world economies, our results 
likely underestimate the impacts of the US and global financial crises on the Asian 
economies. Second, the global financial crisis and the need for global rebalancing would 
require EEA economies to shift demand from external to internal sources. Using a static ADBI Working Paper 254    Kawai and Zhai 
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multi-sectoral general equilibrium  model,  our previous work has shown that, given the 
different product composition in domestic and external demand, this would involve 
substantial structural shifts in their production activities  (Kawai and Zhai, 2009). Without 
sectoral disaggregation, our model does not fully capture the role of structural adjustment 
and the associated adjustment costs required for growth rebalancing. A dynamic general 
equilibrium model incorporating detailed sectoral disaggregation—including tradables and 
non-tradables sectors—and inter-sectoral labor adjustment frictions would better serve the 
detailed analysis of dynamic impacts of the global financial crisis. Finally, recent advances in 
trade theory have emphasized the importance of the extensive margin in trade adjustment. 
Incorporating firm heterogeneity and dynamics of firm entry and exit into the traditional 
framework of new open economy macroeconomics model may somewhat alter the analytical 
results, and provide new insights about the implications of global financial  crisis and 
rebalancing.
6
                                                 
6 See Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007) and Kumhof, Laxton, and Naknoi (2009) for the incorporation of firm 
dynamics into dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. Corsetti, Martin, and Pesenti (2008) analyzed the 
exchange rate adjustment to correct the global imbalance in consideration of endogenous firm entry and new 
varieties of exports of goods and services, suggesting milder exchange rate adjustments for reducing US current 
account deficits.  




Blanchard, O. J. 1985. Debt, Deficits, and Finite Horizons. Journal of Political Economy 
93(2): 223–247. 
Bilbiie, F., F. Ghironi, and M. Melitz. 2007. Monetary Policy and Business Cycles with 
Endogenous Entry and Product Variety. NBER Working Paper 13199. Cambridge, 
MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Corsetti, G., P. Martin, and P. Pesenti. 2008. Varieties and the Transfer Problem: the 
Extensive Margin of Current Account Adjustment. NBER Working Paper 1379. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Hertel, T., D. Hummels, M. Ivanic, and R. Keeney. 2007. How Confident Can We Be of 
CGE-based Assessments of Free Trade Agreements? Economic Modelling 24(4): 
611–635. 
Kawai, M., and F. Zhai. 2009. China-Japan-United States Integration amid Global 
Rebalancing: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis. Journal of Asian 
Economics 20(6): 688–699. 
Knudsen, M., L. H. Pedersen, T. W. Petersen, P. Stephensen, and P. Trier. 1998. Dynamic 
Calibration of a CGE-Model with a Demographic Application. Mimeographed, 
Statistics Denmark, Copenhagen. 
Kumhof, M., and D. Laxton. 2007. A Party without a Hangover? On the Effects of U.S. Fiscal 
Deficits. IMF Working Paper 07/202. Washington, DC: IMF. 
Kumhof, M., D. Laxton, and K. Naknoi. 2009. Does the Exchange Rate Belong in Monetary 
Policy Rules: New Answers from a DSGE Model with Endogenous Tradability and 
Trade Frictions. Forthcoming in Proceedings from the ECB Conference on 
Globalization and the Macroeconomy. Frankfurt, Germany: European Central Bank. 
Laxton, D. 2008. Getting to Know the Global Economy Model and Its Philosophy. IMF Staff 
Papers 55(2): 213–242. 
McKibbin, W. J., and P. J. Wilcoxen. 1998. The Theoretical and Empirical Structure of the G-
Cubed Model. Economic Modelling 16(1): 123–148. 
McKibbin, W. J., and A. Stoeckel. 2009. Modelling the Global Financial Crisis. CAMA 
Working Paper Series 25/2009. Canberra: Centre for Applied Macroeconomic 
Analysis, Australian National University.  
Obstfeld, M., and K. Rogoff. 1995. Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux. Journal of Political 
Economy 103(3): 624–660. 
———. 1996. Foundations of International Macroeconomics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
———. 2005. Global Current Account Imbalances and Exchange Rate Adjustments. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2005(1): 67–123.  
Rotemberg, J. 1982. Sticky Prices in the United States. Journal of Political Economy 90(6): 
1187–1211. 
Ruhl, K. 2003. Solving the Elasticity Puzzle in International Economics. Mimeographed, 
University of Texas, Austin. 
Wendner, R. A. 1999. Calibration Procedure of Dynamic CGE Models for Non-Steady State 
Situations Using GEMPACK. Computational Economics 13(3): 265–287. 
Yaari, M. E. 1965. Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer. 
Review of Economic Studies 32: 137–150. ADBI Working Paper 254    Kawai and Zhai 
 
21 
Zhang, W., Z. Zhang, and G. Han. 2010. How Does the US Credit Crisis Affect the Asia–
Pacific Economies?—Analysis Based on a General Equilibrium Model. Journal of 




APPENDIX: MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Basic Setup 
The model economy consists of four regional blocs, which are indexed by r or s. Each region 
is populated by overlapping generations households  with  finite planning horizons as in 
Blanchard (1985). Households are indexed by age a. In each region there are a continuum 
of firms  and a continuum of labor unions, which are indexed by n∈[0,1]  and  μ∈[0,1], 
respectively. The time index in the model is t.  
The model assumes the presence of an exogenous trend in labor productivity growth (at rate 
g-1). For a clear separation of an  endogenous dynamic from an  exogenous trend, we 
present all variables in detrended form through division by g.  In each region the CPI is the 
numéraire of the economy and all national prices are expressed in terms of domestic 
consumption units.  
In the model described below, subscripts denote region and/or time. The time index, t, is 
omitted when all variables in an equation are with the same time index. Regional subscript, r, 
is also omitted where doing so does not lead to confusion.  
Demand and Trade 
Domestic demand in each region comprises consumption and investment by households, 
firms and government. A composite good, XA, is used for final and intermediate demand. 
This composite good is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) aggregation of domestic 
goods, XD, and aggregate imports, XM.  
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Aggregate import demand, XM, is a CES aggregation of imports from each region, i.e.: ADBI Working Paper 254    Kawai and Zhai 
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where  rs α  is the preference of agents in region s biased for goods imported from region r; 
rs XE  represents the quantity of goods produced in region r and sold in (or exported to) the 
market of region s; and σ
w is the second-level Armington elasticity of substitution among 
imports from different regions.  The dual price index of aggregate import,  s PM , is defined 
over the prices of each import supplier or export goods producer,  rs PE : 
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where τrs is the tariff rate imposed on imports from region r and εr is the CPI-based real 
exchange rate of region r, expressed as the price of one unit of US consumption in terms of 
domestic consumption in region r.  
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Each firm is assumed to produce a differentiated product and each variety is an equally 
imperfect substitute for all others across all  varieties.  The goods produced are either 
domestically demanded or exported. The aggregate demand for domestic goods, XD, and 
aggregate exports, XE, are further decomposed into demand for variety provided by each 
















































s n xd , represents  the  demand in region s  for  domestic  good  variety  n  produced in 
region s; 
n
rs n xe ,  represents the demand in region s for export variety n produced in region r;  
pdn,s  is the price of domestic good variety n set by the firm in region s; pen,rs is the price of 
export variety n in market s set by the firm located in region r; and σ
f is the substitution 
elasticity among varieties of each firm. 
Firms 
Production technology of firms is modeled using a nested CES function. At the top level, the 
output is produced as a combination of public capital and an aggregate private input using 
Cobb-Douglas technology. At the second level, the aggregate private input is split into an ADBI Working Paper 254    Kawai and Zhai 
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intermediate input and an aggregate primary factor. At the third level, the aggregate primary 
factor is further disaggregated into a bundle of private capital and aggregate labor. Finally, at 
the bottom level, aggregate labor is decomposed into the differentiated labor input by each 
union. The stock of public capital is identical for all firms and provided free of charge to them. 
As the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale for private inputs, the return 
to public capital is distributed to firms as profits.   
Each firm produces a different variety and sets the  price of its product facing  isoelastic 
demand functions in both domestic and foreign markets, as shown in (8) and (9).  There is 
an  adjustment cost for price  setting, which, expressed as a proportion of total sales, is 
assumed to be given by the following functions:  
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r φ  and 
p
s φ  are respectively adjustment cost coefficients in region r and region s; and 
t r, π  is the inflation rate in region r at time t.  These adjustment cost functions indicate that 
the cost is related to changes in nominal prices of products relative to the contemporaneous 
inflation target for the CPI, shown by  t r, π . (11) indicates that the export price is set in the 
currency of the destination market, i.e., local-currency pricing.  
A firm n is assumed to maximize the discounted value of current and future profits, denoted 
as divn, which are distributed as dividends to shareholders: 
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subject to CES production technology, the demand functions of (8) and (9), and the 
adjustment costs in price setting of (10) and (11), and given the price of aggregate output, 
PX, and the law of motion of capital: 
t n
I
t n t n t t n K K g K , , , 1 1 , ) 1 ( Γ + − = + + δ                 (13.) 
 
where Kn,r,t and 
n
t r n I , ,  are respectively private capital stock and investment of firm n in region 
r at time t; 
g
t r n K , ,  is the stock of public capital; Rr,t and 
g
t r R ,  are respectively the prices of 
private and public capital; δ is the depreciation rate of capital. 
I
n Γ  is the adjustment cost of 
investment, which is a function of the investment-to-capital ratio and takes on value zero in 
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As shown in (12), the firm’s profits (or dividends) include the after-tax return to its private 
capital, the return to public capital captured, and the  gains  the  firm obtains from selling 
products in the domestic and foreign markets. The optimization problem of the firm is to set 
its levels of investment, the labor input, the intermediate input, and the nominal prices of its 
products in domestic and exporting markets in order to maximize the discounted present 




























φ                   (15.) 
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δ τ             (16.) 
where q is the shadow price of private capital, i.e., Tobin’s q. 
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    (18.) 
where 
pd
t r n , , π  is the inflation rate of variety n in domestic market and 
pe
t s r n , , , π  is the inflation rate 
of variety n produced in country r and sold in region s.  
The first order conditions with respect to production inputs lead to the following demand 
functions and price indices of aggregate inputs:  
PN PX X XN
n ⋅ ⋅ =α                      (19.) 
g n g R PX X K ⋅ ⋅ − = ) 1 ( α                     (20.) 
( )
n n
XN K A X
g α α −
⋅ =
1
                     (21.) 
XN VA
v ⋅ =α                        (22.) 
XN XI
n ⋅ =α                        (23.) 
PI PV PN
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σ σ σ α α
− − − + =                  (27.) 
where 
n α  and 
v α  are respectively the share parameters for the aggregate primary factor 
and the intermediate input in the production function of aggregate private input; 
l α  and 
k α  
are respectively the share parameters for the aggregate labor input and private capital in the 
production function of the aggregate primary factor;  X, K
g, XN, VA, XI, L, K  represent 
output, public capital, aggregate private input, aggregate primary factor, intermediate input, 
aggregate labor and private capital, respectively; and PX, R
g, PN, PV, PI, W and R are their 
corresponding price indices. σ
v is elasticity of substitution between labor and capital.  
Firms have the CES aggregator of the differentiated labor varieties provided by labor unions. 

























µ µ                   (28.) 
where  µ l  is the quantity of labor provided by union µ  and 
l σ  is the elasticity of substitution 
across labor varieties. Cost minimization of firms implies that demand for labor µ  is a 
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1 ) (                   (30.) 
Households  
In each period, mr(1-θ) individuals are born in region r and they face a constant probability of 
death (1-θ) after their birth. This implies that the total number of population is mr in region r. 
We distinguish two types of households, forward-looking ones denoted by FL, and liquidity-
constrained ones denoted by LC. For a representative household of age a, its period utility in 
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 
   
1−σ
            (31.) 
where  σ  is the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution and η  is  the  weight of 
consumption in the utility function. The term  1
~
− t c  represents past per capita consumption of 
household h’s peers, i.e. FL households or LC households. v parameterizes the degree of ADBI Working Paper 254    Kawai and Zhai 
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habit persistence. This exhibits the “catching up with the Joneses” type of external habit 
formation.  












τ σβθ t a t a u g U                   (32.) 
where β  is the subjective discount rate, possibly time-variable but converging to a steady 
state constant in the long run.  
The decision problem of a forward-looking household is to maximize its lifetime utility (32) 
subject to the following sequences of period budget constraints: 
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          (33.) 
In the above expression, Ba  is  the amount of domestic government  bonds  held  by  the 
representative household at age a, denominated in domestic currency; 
*
a B  is the amount of 
international bonds held by household a, denominated in the US dollar; V denotes the value 
of a claim to firm profits in current and all future periods;  a z  is the share of firms owned by 
the represent household at age a; π and π* are respectively domestic and US CPI inflation 
rates; i and i* are respectively the domestic and US nominal interest rates; ζ  is the risk 
premium on international bonds; Div is the total dividends paid by all firms to households; 
FL
a TR  represents revenue from unions’ profits rebated to forward-looking household a in a 
lump-sum way; and TTa is the lump-sum net tax for household a. Labor incomes 
h
a a
h l w φ  are 
taxed at the rate 











                    (34.) 
where θ is the constant probability of survival in each period and χ (<1) determines the 
speed of decline of an individual household’s labor productivity throughout his lifetime.  
The first order conditions of the forward-looking household’s optimization problem with 
respect to B, B
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,                    (37.) 
1 1 1 ) 1 ( + + + + = + t t t t t t g V Div i  V π                   (38.) 
With some algebraic derivations, the aggregate consumption of all forward-looking 
households can be expressed as a fraction of the sum of their financial wealth, FW, and 
human wealth, HW. Human wealth is composed of two parts, the expected present ADBI Working Paper 254    Kawai and Zhai 
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discounted value of future labor income, HWL, and the expected present discounted value of 
future transfer incomes, HWT.  
) )( 1 ( t t t t
FL
t FW HW i C + + = Θ                  (39.) 
t t t t t V B B FW + + =
*
1 - ε                    (40.) 
t t t HWT HWL HW + =                   (41.) 
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θ π 1 1 1 ) 1 ( + + + + = + t t t
FL
t i t g HWT TR i HWT               (43.) 
1 − Θ  is the marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth. This inverse of the marginal 
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where J is already defined in (36).  
A liquidity-constrained household has no access to capital markets. Its decision problem is 









t a TT TR l w c , , , ) 1 ( − + − = φ τ                 (45.) 
where 
LC
a TR  is the lump-sum revenue from union’s profits rebated to the liquidity-
constrained household a. The first order conditions with respects to consumption and labor 














⋅ 1 - s m
LC                   (46.) 
where s
LC  is the share of liquidity-constrained agents in total households and L
LC  is the 
effective aggregate labor supply of liquidity-constrained households.  
Unions 
In each region, there is a continuum of unions which buy labor from households and sell 
labor to firms. They are perfectly competitive in their input markets and monopolistically 
competitive in their output market. Each union has power to set the nominal wage of the 
labor they provide.  Similarly to the price setting by firms, wage changes are subject to 
adjustment costs. The adjustment cost function of nominal wage change  is assumed as 























µ                 (47.) 
The decision problem of each union is to maximize the present discounted value of nominal 
wages paid by firms, wu, minus nominal wages paid out to households, w
h, minus wage 
change adjustment cost, by setting the nominal wage: 
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            (49.) 
where  1 , , , / − ⋅ = t t t
w
t w w µ µ µ π π  is the wage inflation rate. 
Government 
Government in region s has the following budget constraint:  
( ) ∑ − −
− − − + + + = + + +
r
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        (50.) 
where  G
C  and  G
I  are government consumption and investment, respectively. The 






t G K g K + − = + + ) 1 ( 1 1 δ                   (51.) 
The central bank in each region is assumed to set the nominal interest rate by employing the 
following monetary policy rule: 
) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 − − − − − − − ∆ − ∆ + ∆ − ∆ + − + = t t e t t y t t t t GDP GDP i i ε ε ω ω π π ωπ       (52.) 
where  π ω ,  y ω  and  e ω  are the weights for the inflation gap, the output growth gap and the 
exchange rate gap, respectively. The variables with bars are target values of the respective 
variables. Note that  e ω > 0 for the emerging East Asian central bank, while  e ω = 0 for the 
central banks in other regions of the world. 
Equilibrium 
The equilibrium condition in the composite good market is that the supply of the composite 
good, XA, is equal to the sum of household consumption demand, government demand for 
consumption and investment, and private demand for intermediate inputs:   
I G G C C XA
I C LC FL + + + + =                 (53.) 
The equilibrium condition in the labor market in each region is:  
LC FL L L L + =                      (54.) 
The international bond is in zero net supply internationally. The market clearing condition for 




* 0     (55.). 
 